In this article I articulate a neo-pragmatist theory of human rights by drawing and expanding upon the American classical pragmatism of G.H. Mead. I characterize this neo-pragmatist theory of rights by its anti-foundationalist, relational, fictive, and constitutive nature. I begin by providing a reconstruction of Mead's social pragmatist approach to rights, a contribution systematically ignored by contemporary sociologists of rights. Next I detail the cost of this disciplinary oblivion by examining how much neo-pragmatism, critical theory, and legal consciousness studies have meanwhile gained by engaging with Mead's work on rights. Finally, I discuss the contributions of this historical-theoretical exercise to the rapidly growing sociology of rights. I show that by supplementing my neo-Meadian approach with a recent interpretation of Hobbes's fictional theory of politics, there appear substantive gains in the empirical study of the origins, consequences, meaning, and denial of rights.
Introduction
1 Specifically, the postwar Zeitgeist refers to the institutionalization of human rights through the UN Charter as a central aspect of globalization; contest over rights claims as a major feature of social and political life; the expanding framework of international human rights conventions; the emergence of regional systems of human rights protection, and the strengthening of human rights remedies at the domestic level. 2 The understanding of theory here proposed follows closely that of Jeffrey C. Alexander in The Theoretical Logic in Sociology. As Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knobl explain: "Theoretical issues thus range from empirical generalizations to comprehensive interpretive systems which link basic philosophical, metaphysical, political and moral attitudes to the world. Anyone wishing to be part of the social scientific world cannot, therefore, avoid engaging in critical debate on all these levels" (2010: 17-8) . This idea that empirical observations are bound up with methodological assumptions, models and even general presuppositions is very much in accord with the social theory proposed here. 3 For an excellent critical review of liberal political theory's conception of rights, see Singer 1999: 1-21.
being a balanced division of labour, however. Whilst there is a significant body of sociological literature in citizenship, the project of a sociology of rights 10 is still very much in its infancy. 11 I wish to help correct this analytical and institutional imbalance by questioning the citizenship-human rights dichotomy from which it originates
Instead of being constrained to operate within either pole, I suggest sociology refocuses its attention in the category of "right" itself, thus undercutting that dichotomy. This exercise of conceptual refocusing draws extensively upon a sociological intellectual tradition that has been systematically overlooked in this area of research -American philosophical pragmatism and, in particular, Mead's original variety of pragmatism.
Addressing the systematic neglect of Mead's work involves overcoming the current narrow, "canonical" conception of the history of social thought prevalent among rights scholars. 12 Of course, most rights scholars do not even show an interest in the contributions classical sociology might retain. Those who do, however, tend to associate contemporary sociology's difficulties in dealing with human rights to the epistemological constraints faced by sociology's trio of founding fathers: Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. 13 Bryan S. Turner, the author of arguably the most influential 10 Contemporary examples of sociology of rights include Sjoberg, Gill and Williams (2001) , Woodiwiss (2003 Woodiwiss ( , 2005 , Morris (2006) , Kurasawa (2007) , and Turner (1993 Turner ( , 1995 Turner ( , 2006 . On the distinct yet related sociology of constitutions, see Thornhill (2008; . On a social theoretical analysis of the origins of human rights, see Joas (2005) . 11 Consider, for instance, the current situation in professional associations. As Somers and Roberts point out (2008: 386) , there is still no section on "rights or human rights" in the American Sociological Association (ASA). Other professional associations, however, do have research sections on rights. In the International Sociological Association (ISA), there has been a Thematic Group on Human Rights and Global Justice since 2006. There is also a similar research section in the "Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française" (AISLF), the GT 13 "Société globale, cosmopolitisme et droits humains." 12 On the problematic of canon-formation in sociology, see Baehr and O'Brien 1994. 13 Examples abound: Kim Lane Scheppele begins her analysis of the relationship between jurisprudence and sociology with the observation that "Marx, Durkheim, and Weber had strong and deep ties to the law" (1994: 384); R.W. Connell decries that none "of the turn-of-the-century sociologists produced a robust theory of rights", a claim with an emphasis on "Weber's nationalism and celebration of state-power, through Durkheim's ethical collectivism" (1995: 26) ; Margaret Somers and Turner's strategy of reconciling foundationalism (albeit in a minimalist version) with constructionism in order to build a new sociology of rights, however, does not strike me as particularly convincing for two main reasons. First, I find Turner's claim that there was "skepticism towards the idea of human and natural rights in classical sociology " (1993: 176) unwarranted. Classical sociology's scepticism towards "natural rights theory" was not directed at rights as such, but against one specific understanding of rights, namely that articulated by the liberal individualist tradition.
But rights can, and have always been, conceived differently. A case in point is G.H.
Mead, whose social pragmatism led him to conceive of rights in radically different terms from the individualistic, a priori and adversarial way liberal thinking suggests.
The suggestion here is that Mead's conception of rights can be construed as a "buried treasure" (Skinner 2002: 126) , a "fruit" of intellectual history available to those willing to "excavate" sociology's past beyond the conventional canonical view.
Christopher Roberts discuss the "spirited engagements with law and jurisprudence" of "Marx, Durkheim, and Weber" (2008: 396-7 A more promising line of inquiry, I suggest, lies in critically re-examining G.H. Mead's legacy. That is the aim of the first section of this article. This section begins with an analysis of Mead's theory of meaning, moves on to a brief discussion of his concept of object, to arrive at Mead's approach to rights. In the second section, I assess the impact of Mead's ideas in contemporary rights research. I focus on three strands of research: neo-pragmatism, critical theory, and legal consciousness theory. In the third section, I contrast the significant impact of Mead's ideas in these three areas with its relative neglect within sociology, in particular the sociology of rights. My claim is that there are good reasons to change this situation. My solution to this problem is a neo-Meadian pragmatist theory of rights. Given its unique focus on the constitutive, fictive, and disruptive character of social action, a pragmatist theory of rights offers significant advantages vis-à-vis existing theories, namely symbolic 14 For a criticism of Turner's foundationalism see e.g. Nash (2012), and Gearty (2006) . 15 A similar point has been made by Joas ([1997 Joas ([ ] 2000 Joas ([ , 2005 .
interactionism, rational choice, functionalism, institutionalism, and practice theories.
The article concludes with an overview of the paper's main contributions. Mead 1910) . See also Mead ([1934 Mead ([ ] 1967 . Secondary sources include, e.g., Joas ([1980 Joas ([ ] 1985 , Cook (1993: 48-66) , Puddephatt (2009); Silva (2007a: 28-42) .
G.H. MEAD RE-EXAMINED
emergence of meaning with a "three-fold" logical structure. This includes 1) the gesture of one individual ("organism", in Mead's terminology); 2) the responding gesture of the second organism; and 3) the "resultant" of the social act. The response of the second organism to the gesture of the first organism is the interpretation of that gesture -this response brings out the meaning (Mead [1934] 1967: 80). Meaning is thus implicit in the structure of the social act and can be studied by analyzing patterns of action resulting from social interaction.
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The value of this "three-fold" theory of meaning for the sociology of rights is readily apparent. Liberal political theory conceives of the meaning of rights as an a priori reality to be discovered through reason. Within social theory, the meaning of rights is Blumer 1969; Fine 2010: 368) . 19 Although it does give historical priority to "social consciousness" over "physical consciousness"; Mead writes: "experience in its original form became reflective in the recognition of selves, and only gradually was there differentiated a reflective experience of things which were purely physical" (2011: 52). Mead sees in this "selfobjectifying" attitude a condition of human rationality -one is rational to the extent to which one is able to take an impersonal, objective attitude towards oneself. 20 "The social object will then be in the gestures, i.e., the early indications of an ongoing social act in another plus the imagery of our own response to that stimulation" (Mead 2011: 55) . 21 Mead writes that, from this dialectical relation arises a "coordination in the structure of the organism of the individual which is also new -as new as the object" (2011: 38). 22 Illustrating this thesis with the Copernican revolution -the "earlier objects were the earth at the center of the world" whereas the "later objects were the sun at the center of a system of planets" (2011: 41) -Mead argues that from the standpoint of "religion, politics, education, and art there was a new world and a new society that had not existed before" (2011: 40-41 Singer 1999: 128-141; Silva 2008: 193-198. Today's sociological empirical research and theoretical reflection on rights has much to gain from Mead's thinking for it fundamentally destabilizes current dichotomies and assumptions, including the idea that human rights are essentially different from citizenship rights or the belief that sociology can only study human rights if it conceives of them as resting upon some sort of (metaphysical) foundation.
Destabilizing these mistaken yet pervasive ways of thinking, however, is easier said than done. I suggest that completing the genealogical exercise of retrieving from collective oblivion one of sociology's "lost treasures", Mead's approach to rights, is a crucial first step in that direction.
At the heart of Mead's approach to rights is the idea that to claim a right is also to attribute it to others: "the individual in asserting his own right is also asserting that of all other members of the community" (2011: 228). " (1922: 37) cited in Somers and Roberts (2008: 413) . 25 See Singer (1999: 27) .
There are two implications I would like to emphasize regarding Mead's concept of social institution. The first implication is that social institutions do not necessarily oppress, nor do they exist in opposition to, individual agents. On the contrary, like rights, social institutions, can be "flexible and progressive, fostering individuality rather than discouraging it". More important than the oppressive or progressive character of institutions, however, is the fact that "without social institutions of some sort (…) there could be no fully mature individual selves or personalities at all" (Mead [1967] 1934: 262). Mead's important insight that social institutions can both constrain and enable one's assertion of one's own distinctiveness, distinct from the conception of social institution of 1980s theories of practice as both structured and structuring, given the evolutionary and emergent character of Mead's conception, 26 takes us directly to my second observation. I refer to the centrality of the concept of the "generalized other" in Mead's thinking generally and, in particular, in his approach to rights.
The attitude of the "generalized other" is Mead's post-metaphysical rendering of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's general will. 27 Through this concept Mead wishes to convey the idea of an internalized set of social attitudes, namely the principles and rules in the light of which individuals coordinate their own behaviour and interpret one another. It has been widely noted that this is a central notion of Mead's social psychology, on a par with his highly influential conception of the structure of the self -the phases or perspectives of the "I" and the "me". What has been less appreciated is the importance of the generalized other with regard to rights. Yet a substantial part 26 As exemplars of social theories of practice, see, e.g., Giddens (1986) , Bourdieu [1980 ), and Sewell (1992 . Frank Parkin is certainly correct when he writes: "the theoretical appeal of practice theory from this point of view, is precisely due to the fact that it does away with the separation (on conceptual and empirical grounds) between subject and object, observer and observed, action and perception, which has been a durable and pervasive set of dualisms in the history of Western thought and Western social theory" (1996: 71-72) . What Parkin fails to acknowledge, however, is that this anti-dualistic orientation came at a price: practice theories tend to focus more upon the reproduction of existing structures than in the creation of new ones (something to which, despite their flaws, rational choice and functionalist models arguably devote more attention). 27 Mead discussed Rousseau's concept of "general will" on various occasions, both in journal articles and in lecture notes. See, e.g., Mead (2011: 225; 1936: 13 Mead's point is that rights are as much a part of the normative structure of a society as they are a part of the political identity of each individual citizen. But Mead has a very specific understanding of what this entails. To have a right is not the same as having a physical object, something that can be accumulated, measured, quantified.
As a social object, to have a right is to enter a political relation, to belong to a community whose norms include that right as something anybody can assert and that everybody can recognize. 28 Mead sees the social relationships rights refer to as intrinsically reflexive. They require every member of the political community to take both roles or positions involved in a rights relation, that of entitlement and that of the obligation to respect it -this is how rights help constitute individual political identities. Third, for Mead, to conceive of rights as relational and reflexive is also to assert their contested nature. The contested nature of rights stems from the tension within the social self between the "I" and the "me", the former being a source of unpredictable creativity, the latter ensuring the internalization of social conventions through the attitude of the generalized other. The dialectical nature of the relation between the two phases of the self means that social norms, rights-norms included, are being continuously internalized and reproduced (through the "me") while being contested and questioned (through the "I"). For Mead, then, rights are contested not only within oneself (i.e., one's legal consciousness is a dialectical process, responsive
The political theorist Iris Marion Young expressed this same idea when she wrote: "Rights are relationships, not things; (…) Rights refer to doing more than having; to social relationships that enable or constrain action " (1990: 25) .
to concrete action-problems in real world situations, and which potentially evolves over time in contradictory ways), but between different selves as well (politicians, judges, and ordinary citizens, for example, often disagree about the interpretation and application of rights). 29 In this sense, to affirm the contested nature of rights is to affirm the political nature of the processes of identity-formation that sustain the claim to rights. Socialization is as much about social reproduction as it is about social transformation. The "I" is constantly questioning the norms integrated by the self via the "me" and does this by appealing to an ideal future community (see, e.g., Deranty
and Renault 2007: 104).
Contested, reflexive, relational; this is how Mead conceives of rights, whose meaning lies in concrete patterns of political interaction, whose institutionalization is as much a symbolic as it is a material process -bills of rights, constitutions, and the state derive much of their power and legitimacy from their fictional character, a power that, for that very reason, often makes itself felt all too tangibly in peoples' lives. 
MEAD'S IMPACT DISCUSSED
The heuristic value of these insights did not pass unnoticed for many in the social sciences and the humanities throughout the twentieth century, both in the United
States and elsewhere. Like philosophical pragmatism as a whole, Mead's social theory was often appropriated, interpreted and used as a powerful conceptual tool with which to subvert and criticize dominant models. 31 In sociology, Herbert Blumer's symbolic interactionism, envisaged to a large extent as an alternative to Talcott 29 This insight is the starting point of the so-called "political" (as opposed to "legal") approaches to rights and constitutionalism in political theory, which operate within a civic-republican paradigm. See e.g. Skinner (1998 ), Pettit (1997 , and especially Bellamy (2007: 16) . On the history of the conceptual linkages between civic republicanism and American pragmatism, see e.g. Silva (2009) . See also Ansell (2011) for a similarly "political", pragmatist approach to governance. 30 On a neo-Hobbesian fictional theory of politics, see Vieira (2008), Skinner (2010) . 31 On the potential for social criticism of American philosophical pragmatism, see e.g. Bernstein (1971) , Habermas ([1981] 1986), Antonio (1989) , Aboulafia (2001 Baert 2005) , by resting upon historically minded strategies of theory-building (e.g., Joas [1980 Joas [ ] 1985 Joas [ , [1992 Joas [ ] 1996 , as well as by distinguishing itself vis-à-vis alternative contemporary approaches, including post-structuralism or the theories of practice as developed for instance by Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. Gross 2009 ). 36 It is from these last 32 E.g., Blumer (1969) . 33 For examples of critiques of Blumer's narrow reading of Mead, see Mills (1942) , MacPhail and Rexroat (1979) . 34 I distinguish between "pragmatist" and "neo-pragmatist" work and their authors exclusively in light of their historical location, the former pertaining to the generation of thinkers that worked between the 1880s and 1930s, the latter including post-1970s practitioners. A good overview of neo-pragmatism is provided in Joas and Knobl (2009: 500-528) . For an excellent extended discussion, see Bernstein (2010) . 35 On the impact of pragmatist philosophy on Herbert Blumer, see Tucker (1988) . For a general discussion of these appropriations, see Gross (2007) . 36 On the relationship between pragmatism and post-structuralism, see e.g. Dunn (1997); on pragmatism and Bourdieu's sociology, see e.g. Aboulafia (1999) , two strategies that one should expect a more fruitful encounter with Mead's approach to rights as they either explicitly deal with the classical pragmatist legacy, which includes it, or they are more directly concerned with providing conceptual tools to empirical research (also because Rorty never addressed Mead in systematic fashion Shalin (1992) . 41 This is because the "generalized other" provides Mead with an explanation of how rights constitute the basis for self-respect. As the bearer of rights, I feel recognized with regard to characteristics I share with everyone else in my political community; but I can only come to understand myself as the bearer of rights when I know, in turn, what normative obligations I must keep regarding others -and it is only when I take the attitude of the '"generalized other", which allows me to see the other members of the community as the bearer of rights, that I can also understand myself to be a legal person. 42 On Fraser's work, see e.g., Fraser (1997 Fraser ( , 1999 Fraser ( , 2000 . For critiques, see Yar (2001), Fowler (2009 ), Armstrong (2008 . On the debate between Fraser and Honneth, see Fraser and Honneth (2003) . 43 In rigor, Honneth's research project begins with the historical work on the workers movement by E.P. Thompson 44 Such a politics of acknowledgement "involves coming to terms with, rather than vainly attempting to overcome, the risk of conflict, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity, and alienation that characterizes life among others" (Markell 2003: 38) . 45 On the Eurocentric character of Honneth's model, see e.g. Thompson (2009) ; on the criticism of its "ethical sectarianism", see Fraser 2003: 228. 46 Instead of aspiring to uncover general principles upon which human conflict is founded, Honneth (rightly) aims at reconstructing the inner logic of the concrete forms that human conflict assumes in different social spheres (Honneth [2000] 2007; see also Markell 2007) . 47 Exemplars of legal consciousness studies include Ewick and Silbey (1992) , Merry (1990) , Sarat (1990) , White (1990) . A different yet related perspective is the constitutive theory of law: see e.g. Fraser (1978) , Thompson (1978) , Hunt (1993) , Habermas ([1992 Habermas ([ ] 1996 . Another related strand of literature studies rights as political resources for progressive social mobilization. In this case, see e.g. McCann (1994) , Goldberg-Hiller (2002) , Herman (1996) , Silverstein (1996) . Consider, for instance, the opening sentence of Scheingold's landmark study The
Politics of Rights (1974) : "This is a book about the law. The law is real, but it is also a figment of our imaginations" ([1974] argued that indignation generated by television reports of "massive resistance" to the civil rights decisions of the US Supreme Court fueled a civil rights movement" ([1974] 2007: xix) . Uniting these otherwise independent projects on rights as powerful symbolic political resources, from which concrete experiences of 48 See Edelman 1964: 26, 34-35, 49-51; see also 1971: 53-57; 1988: 96-97. 49 Other influences include political psychology, post-war social science of mass society, and the cultural studies of Durkheim and Clifford Geertz. See Feeley (2007: xiv) . something before which they stand, with which they engage, and against which they 50 Robert Brigham's The Constitution of Interests, which problematizes Scheingold's relatively unqualified claims about rights as political resources, is perhaps the major new addition to this literature (Brigham 1996) . For a criticism, according to which rights do not, either directly or indirectly, promote social change, see Rosenberg (1991) . As a research topic located at the intersection of law and sociology, there is some work on legal consciousness by sociologists. The most recent examples include Hoffmann (2003) , Larson (2004) , and Marshall (2006) . 51 See e.g. Sckopol (1979) , March and Olson (1984) , DiMaggio and Powell (1991) . 52 For complementary analysis of how individuals conceive of their multiple communities of belonging (geographical, national, and racial) , see e.g. Wong (2010). Mead seems to be the most promising. Mead's social evolutionary orientation to the issues of emergence, creativity, and novelty goes hand-in-hand with its hermeneutic 53 On Sewell's influence (1992), see Ewick and Silbey (1998: 40 ff) . 54 On the limitations of functionalist approaches to institutional origins and change, see Pierson (2000) . For a critique of the difficulties of providing causal accounts of social institutions associated with practice theory, see Chapter 2 of Turner (1994) . 55 See e.g. Mathieu Deflem, who uncritically subscribes to the Blumerian version of the past in his recounting of the intellectual predecessors of legal consciousness studies (2008: 132-135) .
sensitivity. Mead, however, cannot "do our thinking for ourselves," 56 in the sense of providing us with a social theory of rights relevant to our time and circumstances.
That is what I propose to do next.
HOW TO STUDY RIGHTS:
A NEO-PRAGMATIST PROPOSAL By definition, a neo-Meadian theory of rights is not Mead's theory but a latter day exercise. There are two reasons why this exercise in theory construction is justified.
The first is that Mead did not himself formulate a consistent "theory of rights" as such. 57 The second reason is that, even if this is the case, Mead's work nonetheless contains the necessary conceptual elements to formulate such a theory. An initial indication that this is true has already been provided in the last section, in the form of several productive encounters with Mead. Now I go a step further and show how I believe a neo-pragmatist theory, particularly a neo-Meadian one, can help sociologists studying the origins, consequences, meaning, and denial of rights.
This exercise in theory building is founded upon a historical reconstruction of Mead's thinking that questions the conventional symbolic interactionist interpretation to suggest that his contributions extend well beyond his social theory of the self. In particular, it is suggested that Mead's social psychological writings are but one of the three pillars that form his intellectual edifice, alongside epistemology and democratic politics. As a result, criticisms of Mead accusing him of not addressing systematically the processes of "material reproduction of societies" (as opposed to the "symbolic reproduction of societies"), which include processes of warfare, economic 56 While in the late-1960s, Quentin Skinner was of the view that in order to seek "answers" to philosophical questions, "we must learn to do our own thinking for ourselves" (Skinner 1969: 52) , in his more recent work he has indicated ways in which historical work can help one to think about politics. I am broadly in agreement with this later position. For a discussion, see Lane (2012) . 57 That is why in this paper I speak not of Mead's "theory of rights", but of Mead's "approach to rights." For a similar understanding, see Cook (1993: 209) . Silva (2007b Silva ( , 2008 , Vieira (2012), Mead (2011) . For a criticism of Mead as an "idealist", see the second volume of Habermas ([1981 Habermas ([ ] 1986 . 59 See Silva 2007a: 62-63; Konings (2010: 64) . 60 On the troubled history of the relation between legal fictions and sociology, see Mohr (2006) . 61 On Hobbes's fictional theory of the state, see, e.g., Vieira (2008) and Skinner (2010) . 62 See e.g. Pitkin (1967 ), Manin (1997 . 63 Hobbes is said to have made a "transition from the theatrical stage, where actions are done in mere sport, and not expected to have life consequences, to the highpowered world of the Leviathan state, where actions such as the momentous decision through its being represented. Its origins lie in a metaphorical covenant of representation. The "Leviathan is at once the cause and the effect of its foundation:
it must be first imag(in)ed, so that it is brought into being" (Vieira 2008: 177) .
There is a striking contrast between this conception of the state as a fiction and
Bourdieu's influential sociology of the state. For Bourdieu, some three centuries ago, a specific group of social agents that he designates the "state nobility", 64 "were led to produce a discourse of state which, by providing justifications for their own positions, constituted the state -this fictio juris which slowly stopped being a mere fiction of jurists to become an autonomous order capable of imposing ever more widely the submission to its functions and its functioning and the recognition of its principles" (1994: 16) . For Bourdieu, then, as for most sociologists, 65 the state first emerges as a legal fiction only to gain effective existence as an autonomous, non-fictional order.
For Hobbes, at least in the Vieira-Skinner reading, the state not only emerges as a fiction but can only subsist over time as "the Greatest of humane Powers". These different understandings bear important implications for empirical research.
According to Bourdieu, research is to be conducted on the constraints of the state over social agents to the level of the most profound corporeal dispositions, both at the phylogenetic and ontogenetic level (1994: 13-14) . 66 By superseding the dichotomy separating processes of "symbolic versus material" social reproduction, the fictional theory of the state, very much like pragmatism, 67 suggests that research should adopt an integrated view of both the reproductive and constraining effects as well as the enabling qualities of fictions. It is not that the state, the law, and rights to wage a foreign war involve us collectively as well as personally" (Vieira 2008: 146) . 64 See Bourdieu ([1989 Bourdieu ([ ] 1998 . 65 For a survey of the materialist sociological theories of the state, see Abrams (1988) . 66 On the law's power to create new social groups, identities, and subjectivity, see Bourdieu ([1986 Bourdieu ([ ] 1987 surveys. What all these methodologies need to share is a common orientation towards the reconstruction of the processes through which rights constrain and/or empower individual citizens and social groups.
These are also the processes within which the meaning of rights is formed. From a neo-pragmatist perspective, this is a key question that the nascent sociology of rights needs to address. By conceiving the meaning of rights as intrinsically contested and socially constituted (as opposed to fixed and stable), I see the sociological study of its origins and effects as an inquiry into collective mobilization. In particular, it should focus on the legal and non-legal spaces in which the meaning of rights is produced 71 On the importance of the written word in modern conditions, see Luhmann (1992) . On how the symbolic power of constitutions helps collectivities mythically come into being, see Wolin (1989) . 72 See Scheppele (2003 Scheppele ( , 2004 . For a constitutional ethnography of the origins of social and economic rights in 1970s Portugal, see Vieira and Silva (forthcoming). On pragmatism and legal ethnographic methods, see Morales (2003) . 73 An obvious predecessor is The Making of Law, Bruno Latour's neo-pragmatist study of the French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d'Etat) . See Latour ([2002] 2010). Latour, of course, is not so much interested in developing a sociology of rights as he is in putting forth a sociological reconstruction of law itself (namely as a regime of truth production). For a discussion, see e.g. Cotterrell (2011).
and fought over, the strategies and resources employed by actors in these meaningmaking practices, as well as the constraining and enabling effects exerted by institutions and structural conditions. In this regard the most obvious predecessor is legal consciousness literature. The examination of the ways in which feminism, civil rights, and pay equity activists have made use of legal indeterminacy "to construct expansively egalitarian readings of rights" is particularly consonant with the kind of approach advocated here (Scheingold [1974 (Scheingold [ ] 2007 .
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Yet as political actors are able to (partly) constitute the rights they enjoy, they are also always faced with the possibility of being deprived of them. Far from being a progressive expansionary tale, the history of human rights is as much a history of creation and implementation as it is a history of retrenchment and denial. From a neo-pragmatist point of view, sociologists should focus more on how the relational and reflexive character of rights is affected by political processes of rights retrenchment and, especially, rights violations as these entail profound consequences for citizen identity. A similar point, of course, has already been made by Honneth, who suggests that the "denial of rights" can be conceived of as a type of "social pathology" amenable to empirical analysis through "group discussions" and "deep interviews", on the premise that these have a "consciousness-raising effect"
(interviewed in Petersen and Willig 2002: 268-269) . Perhaps even more interesting is the growing literature on cultural trauma (see e.g. Alexander et al. 2004) , whose strong constructivist bent is very much in line with neo-Meadian sociology.
Conclusion
There are three main contributions I wish to make in this paper. The first contribution is to place G.H. Mead among the precursors of the modern day sociology of rights.
This involved reconstructing Mead's (admittedly sketchy) approach to rights as a 74 Of particular relevance is the literature on rights and progressive legal mobilization. This strand in the literature sees legal language as "indeterminate and malleable" (Silverstein 1996: 7) , as a contested discursive arena in which legal meanings take shape. See also Brigham (1998: 16) .
coherent social theory of rights. This was only possible due to the combination of a historical reconstruction of Mead's thinking, in which several aspects of his work were brought together to build a systematic account of rights, and theory-building.
This second task involved a critical review of the appropriations of Mead's work on rights, including socio-legal studies. The paper's second major contribution has been to shed more light on this little known historical episode of intellectual diffusion. The third, more general, contribution of the paper has been to show how productive an encounter between American philosophical pragmatism and contemporary social sciences can be. In particular, I have tried to show the extent to which sociological empirical research on the origins, meaning, implementation and denial of rights can benefit from a neo-Meadian approach. 
